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Abstract. The auction theory literature has so far focused mostly on the design
of mechanisms that takes the revenue or the efficiency as a yardstick. However,
scenarios where the capacity, which we define as “the number of bidders the
auctioneer wants to have a positive probability of getting the item”, is a fun-
damental concern are ubiquitous in the information economy. For instance, in
sponsored search auctions (SSA’s) or in online ad-exchanges, the true value of
an ad-slot for an advertiser is inherently derived from the conversion-rate, which
in turn depends on whether the advertiser actually obtained the ad-slot or not;
thus, unless the capacity of the underlying auction is large, key parameters, such
as true valuations and advertiser-specific conversion rates, will remain unknown
or uncertain leading to inherent inefficiencies in the system. In general, the same
holds true for all information goods/digital goods. We initiate a study of mecha-
nisms, which take capacity as a yardstick, in addition to revenue/efficiency. We
show that in the case of a single indivisible item one simple way to incorporate
capacity constraints is via designing mechanisms to sell probability distributions,
and that under certain conditions, such optimal probability distributions could
be identified using a Linear programming approach. We define a quantity called
price of capacity to capture the tradeoff between capacity and revenue/efficiency.
We also study the case of sponsored search auctions. Finally, we discuss how gen-
eral such an approach via probability spikes can be made, and potential directions
for future investigations.
1 Introduction
“The tension between giving away your information- to let people know what you have
to offer- and charging them for it to recover your costs is a fundamental problem in the
information economy.”
— Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian in Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the
Network Economy, Harvard Business School Press (1998).
The advent of the Internet as a big playground for resource sharing among selfish
agents with diverse interests, and the emergence of Web as a giant platform for hosting
information has raised a plethora of opportunities for commerce, as well as, a plenty
of new design, pricing and complexity problems. One good example of a multi-billion
dollar industry evolved as a consequence of Web is the sponsored search advertising
(SSA), making fortunes for Internet Search giants such as Google and Yahoo!, and
has got tremendous attention in academia recently, due to various interesting research
problems originated as a result of this continuously growing industry[1, 3, 7, 12, 13, 15,
17–20, 24, 25]. One of the most important concern for such an industry or in general for
the information economy is the “pricing problem”. For example, for the goods like an
ad-slot in the SSA which has no intrinsic value and is perishable, it is not clear what
price should it be sold for. Similarly, for a digital good, where the cost of reproduction
is negligible, the standard way of pricing based on the production cost does not work.
Therefore, auctions are becoming a popular pricing mechanism in electronic commerce
as they automatically adjust prices to market conditions, and specifically prices gets
adjusted according to its value to the consumers rather than to the production costs.
Auction theory has a pretty impressive literature [10, 14]- from the lovely Vickrey auc-
tion to the sponsored search auctions[7, 24] and the auctions of digital goods[8, 9]. The
literature has so far focused mostly on the design of mechanisms that takes the revenue
or the efficiency as a yardstick. This is perfectly logical as these are two very important
metrics from the viewpoint of the seller/auctioneer and the society respectively. How-
ever, the scenarios where the capacity, which we define as “the number of bidders the
auctioneer wants to have a positive probability of getting the item”, is a fundamental
concern are ubiquitous in the information economy1. For instance, in the sponsored
search auctions or in online ad-exchanges, the true value of an ad-slot for an advertiser
is inherently derived from the conversion-rate, which in turn depends on whether the
advertiser actually obtained the ad-slot or not, which in turn depends on the capacity. In
general, the same holds true for all information goods/digital goods.
In the present paper, our goal is to first motivate capacity as a fundamental metric
in designing auctions in the information economy and then to initiate study of such
a design framework for some simple and interesting scenarios. In Section 2, we mo-
tivate the capacity as a fundamental and interesting additional metric on the top of
revenue/efficiency for mechanism design. In Section 3, we start with the capacity con-
strained framework for selling an indivisible item. We propose a simple way to incorpo-
rate capacity constraints via designing mechanisms to sell probability distributions. We
show that such optimal probability distributions could be identified using a Linear pro-
gramming approach, objective being revenue, efficiency or a related function. Further,
we define a quantity called price of capacity to capture the tradeoff between capacity
and revenue/efficiency and derive upper bounds on it. In Section 4, we discuss the case
of sponsored search auctions and also note that the auctioneer controlled probability
spikes based auctions suggests a new model for sponsored search advertising, where
a click is sold directly and not indirectly via allocating impressions. In Section 5, we
conclude with a list of research directions for future work, inspired by the present paper.
2 Motivation: the need for an additional metric
Experience goods: A bidder might not know her true valuation for the item unless she
acquires it sometimes meaning that the true value is inherently derived from the actual
1 Clearly, this capacity can be increased indefinitely albeit
acquisition of the item. Such a good is called an experience good[16,22, 2]. Experience
goods are ubiquitous in the information economy as clearly all information goods are
experience goods[22, 2]. Sometimes, a particular good might also act as an experience
for another good. For example, a particular song from a singer might act as an experi-
ence for another song of that singer. Therefore, in the auction of an experience good, the
values for some of the bidders can be known to them as they might have experienced it
from an earlier purchase of this or a related item, and for the other bidders the values
are still unknown and they have to simply guess this value if they are participating in
the auction. For the second kind of bidders, even if their values might turn out to be
pretty high, their guesses might not be high enough to actually acquire the item when
revenue/efficiency is the only goal. Moreover, they might be loss-averse[23] and would
not bid a high value at all, due to the potential risk involved if the item does not turn
out to be of high value to them. Therefore, it is important that such bidders be given a
chance to acquire the item, and consequently capacity becomes a fundamental metric
in designing the mechanisms to achieve this goal.
Two-fold exploration in sponsored search auctions: First, the ad-slots in the SSA are
necessarily experience goods for a new advertiser and the estimates for the advertisers
getting lower ranked slots is also generally poor as they hardly get any clicks. The value
of an ad-slot is derived from the clicks themselves (i.e. rate of conversion or purchase
given a click), and therefore, unless the bidder actually obtains a slot and receives user
clicks, there is essentially no means for her to estimate her true value for the associated
keyword.
Second, even if all the true valuations are known to the corresponding bidders, for
each bidder the SSA involves a parameter called quality score of the bidder which is de-
fined as the expected clickability of the bidder for the associated keyword if she obtains
a slot. This parameter is also not known a priori and the auctioneer needs to estimate
it. Certainly, a model that automatically allows one to estimate these key parameters
(i.e. Click-Through-Rates and true values) is desirable. Indeed, some mechanisms to
incorporate explorations for estimating such important parameters has started to appear
in literature[18, 25]. Capacity as an additional metric can provide a generic framework
for designing such exploration based mechanisms.
Avoiding over-exposure in online advertising: Typically, the online ad-exchanges
such as Right Media or DoubleClick convince their advertisers that their ads will not
be over exposed to users. One way of avoiding such an over-exposure could be via
increasing capacity.
Uncertainty and switching costs: Let us consider a production company H buying
raw materials (multiple units of a good) from providers A,B and C via a reverse-
auction and H is uncertain about the time these providers might take to deliver the raw
material to H . The providers are very likely to lie about the delivery times and it is hard
to incorporate delivery times in designing the auction. If the goal of the auctioneer (i.e.
the company H) is cost minimization, it will buy the raw material from the provider
with the minimum ask (assume that the ask of B is smaller than that of A which is
smaller than that of C). Now if the provider B lied about the delivery time at least
for a significant fraction of the total required units, H’s production gets delayed. If H
wants to switch to some other provider, run another auction and buys from A, now it
will buy at a higher cost and their is still a delay in H’s production as A will take its
time in delivery too. The time taken by A could actually be smaller than that of B’s for
the remaining units, however, still there is a delay. Moreover, such delay might persist
further as A could also lie about its delivery time. It might have been better if H would
buy not only from B to start with and give A,C a chance as well. Therefore, one way
to reduce such delay times could be via increasing capacity as per our definition.
3 Selling an indivisible item
3.1 The model to sell via probability spikes
There is a single indivisible item for sale. There areN bidders interested in the item. The
bidder i has a value vi for this item2. The item is sold via an auction on an experiment
designed by the seller/auctioneer. The experiment has M outcomes (O1, O2, . . . , OM )
with associated probabilities (p1, p2, . . . , pM ), where
∑M
i=1 pi = 1, pi ≥ 0∀i. There-
fore, the item is essentially sold via an auction of the probability spikes (p1, p2, . . . , pM )
wherein the auctioneer can choose these probability spikes in advance or adaptively
based on bidders’ reports so as to achieve some defined goal such as maximizing her
profit or efficiency or to accommodate a wider pool of bidders. Bidders bid on the ex-
periment by reporting bids bi’s to indicate their respective values of the item. At most
one probability spike is assigned to each bidder. Thus there are effectively two steps in
this auction model.
– Stage 1 (commit/compete): The bidders report their bids bi’s and by way of using
some mechanism, the auctioneer assigns the probability spikes to them and decides
corresponding payments to be made by them. Let us call a bidder a prospective
winner if she was assigned one of the probability spikes.
– Stage 2 (win or lose): The experiment is performed. If the outcome of the exper-
iment is Oj , then the prospective winner assigned to the spike pj is declared the
winner, and is given the item.
Further, the auctioneer could choose various payment schemes such as -
– Betting: Every prospective winner is charged its payment decided in compete/commit
stage irrespective of whether she will be a winner or not.
– Pay-per-acquisition: A bidder is charged the amount decided in compete stage only
when she is a winner i.e. only when she actually acquires the item.
The above model can also be interpreted as selling of a single divisible item in terms of
specified fractional bundles, the bundles corresponding to the probability spikes.
2 Note that, as discussed earlier in Section 2, for some bidders vi’s are the actual true values
while for some others these are just crude estimates/guesses.
3.2 Mechanisms to sell probability spikes
Without loss of generality, let us assume that p1 ≥ p2 · · · ≥ pM ≥ 0. Further, for
notational simplicity let M = {1, 2, . . . ,M},N = {1, 2, . . . , N}. Let σ : N −→ N be
the allocation rule and h : N −→ R+ be the payment rule decided in compete stage.
Thus, for j ∈ M, the spike j is assigned to the bidder σ(j) and for j ∈ N −M, the
bidder σ(j) is not assigned any spike. Further, for j ∈ M, hj is the expected payment
to be made by the bidder σ(j) and hj = 0 otherwise. Therefore, the expected utility
of the bidder assigned to spike j is given by uσ(j) = pjvσ(j) − hj for j ∈ M and is
zero otherwise. For the sake of simplicity, let p1 > p2 · · · > pM > 0, then the famous
VCG mechanism ranks the bidders by their bids (and true values vi’s as being a truthful
mechanism) and charges them their respective opportunity costs. That is, σ(j) is the
bidder with the jth maximum bid and hj =
∑M−1
i=j (pi − pi+1)vσ(i+1) + pMvσ(M+1)
for j ∈M and zero otherwise. If the payment is done via the betting model then this is
the amount charged to bidder j in the compete/commit stage. If the payment is done via
pay-per-acquisition and j is the winner then she is charged an amount hj
pj
, and therefore,
her expected payment is still hj as pj is the probability that she wins. Therefore, the
auctioneer’s revenue is
RV CG =
M−1∑
i=1
(pi − pi+1)ivσ(i+1) + pMMvσ(M+1). (1)
Let θj = pj − pj+1; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1&θM = pM be the spike gaps, then pj =∑M
i=j θi. The condition
∑M
i=1 pi = 1 translates to
∑M
i=1 iθi = 1 and p1 ≥ p2 · · · ≥
pM ≥ 0 translates to θj ≥ 0∀j = 1, 2, . . . ,M. Therefore,
RV CG =
M∑
i=1
θiidi where di = vσ(i+1) (2)
and clearly di ≥ di+1 as VCG ranks by true values.
Lemma 1 The revenue of the auctioneer in the VCG mechanism for selling probability
spikes (p1, p2, . . . , pM ) can be expressed asRV CG =
∑M
i=1 θiidi where θi = pi−pi+1
for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1, θM = pM and di ≥ di+1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
Further, the efficiency for the VCG mechanism is
EV CG =
M∑
j=1
pjvσ(j) =
M∑
j=1
(
M∑
i=j
θi)vσ(j)
=
M∑
i=1
(
i∑
j=1
vσ(j))θi =
M∑
i=1
θiidi (3)
where di =
1
i
i∑
j=1
vσ(j). (4)
Further, we have
di − di+1 =
1
i
i∑
j=1
vσ(j) −
1
(i+ 1)
i+1∑
j=1
vσ(j) =
1
i(i+ 1)


i∑
j=1
(i + 1)vσ(j) −
i+1∑
j=1
ivσ(j)


=
1
i(i+ 1)


i∑
j=1
vσ(j) − ivσ(i+1)

 = 1i(i+ 1)


i∑
j=1
(vσ(j) − vσ(i+1))


≥ 0 as vσ(j) ≥ vσ(i+1)∀j = 1, 2, . . . , i.
Lemma 2 The efficiency in the VCG mechanism for selling probability spikes (p1, p2, . . . , pM )
can be expressed asEV CG =
∑M
i=1 θiidi where θi = pi−pi+1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,M−
1, θM = pM and di ≥ di+1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
Definition 1. We say that a linear function H of spike-gaps θj’s is gap-wise monotone
if H = ∑Mj=1 θjjdj , where dj ’s do not depend on gaps θj’s and dj ≥ dj+1 for all
j = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
Definition 2. A mechanism for selling probability spikes is called gap-wise monotone
if the revenue of the auctioneer at the prescribed equilibrium point is gap-wise mono-
tone and is called strongly gap-wise monotone if the social value (i.e. efficiency) at the
prescribed equilibrium point is gap-wise monotone as well.
Therefore, from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The VCG mechanism for selling probability spikes is strongly gap-wise
monotone.
Define, u∗i (h) = max{maxj∈M(pjvi − hj), 0}.
Definition 3. Walrasian Equilibrium: Let σ be an allocation and h be a payment
rule, then (σ, h) is called a Walrasian equilibrium if for all j ∈ N, uσ(j) = u∗σ(j)(h).
Following [21, 6, 4], it is not hard to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let σ be an allocation and h be a payment rule, then (σ, h) is a Walrasian
equilibrium iff it is efficient.
Therefore, at a Walrasian equilibrium, bidders are ranked according to their values and
efficiency can be written as in the case of VCG i.e
∑M
j=1 pjvσ(j) where vσ(j) ≥ vσ(j+1)
for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
Theorem 5 Let (σ, h) be a Walrasian equilibrium for selling probability spikes then
the efficiency at this equilibrium is gap-wise monotone.
This means that optimal efficiency is always gap-wise monotone. Further, the optimal
omniscient auction (i.e. when the auctioneer knows everyone’s true value vi’s) extracts
a revenue equal to
∑M
j=1 pjvσ(j), where vσ(j) ≥ vσ(j+1) for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1 .
Therefore, the optimal revenue of omniscient auction is also gap-wise monotone.
3.3 A Generic Framework for Selecting Optimal Spikes
In this section, we develop a Linear Programming approach to identify optimal prob-
ability spikes subject to the capacity constraints in terms of spikes gaps, where the
objective is a gap-wise monotone function. For such functions, it is simpler to put the
constraints in terms of spike-gaps than in terms of spikes themselves, however, it won’t
be hard to see that a similar approach can also be developed if we put the constraints in
terms of the spikes, as well as, in the case of functions more general than the gap-wise
monotone. For the sake of simplicity we omit any such details.
Let H be a gap-wise monotone function and {ǫj}Mj=1 be a generic set of parameters
with the property that
M∑
i=1
iǫi ≤ 1. (5)
ǫj ≥ 0; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M (6)
and let us consider the following Linear Programming Problem in variables θj’s,
Max H =
M∑
j=1
θjjdj
s.t.
M∑
i=1
iθi = 1 (7)
θj ≥ ǫj ; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M (8)
The dual problem is
Min x0 −
M∑
j=1
ǫjxj
s.t. xj ≥ 0; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M (9)
− jdj + jx0 − xj = 0; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M
and the KKT conditions are
M∑
i=1
iθi = 1
θj ≥ ǫj ; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M
xj ≥ 0; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M (10)
−jdj + jx0 − xj = 0; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M
xj(ǫj − θj) = 0; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M
and therefore an optimal solution is
x∗0 = d1
x∗j = j(d1 − dj)
θ∗j = ǫj∀j = 2, . . . ,M
θ∗1 = 1−
M∑
i=2
iǫi (11)
as it can be checked to satisfy the KKT conditions. The optimal value is
HOPT ({ǫj}) = d1 −
M∑
j=2
jǫj(d1 − dj). (12)
Clearly, the maximum of the optimal solution HOPT (ǫ1, ǫ2, . . . , ǫM ) over parameters
{ǫj}’s is attained when ǫj = 0 for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,M and in that case
HOPT = d1. (13)
Now, note that the primal optimal variables θj’s do not depend on the quantities dj’s at
all. Therefore, so long as H is gap-wise monotone, the optimal solution to the primal
remains the same as in equation 11. It is quite intuitive as the best possible spike allowed
by the capacity constraints is assigned to the best possible bidder (i.e. σ(1)), and all
other spikes are the minimum possible as per the constraints.
Theorem 6 LetH =
∑M
j=1 θjjdj be a gap-wise monotone function and the spike-gaps
θj’s satisfy conditions 8, 5 and 6, then the optimal choice of spike-gaps are given by
equation 11 and the optimal value of H is given by equation 12 .
3.4 The Price of Capacity
Given parameters {ǫj}, let us define the capacity as
κ({ǫj}) = max
j
{j : ǫj > 0}. (14)
Now consider the parameters {ǫ˜j} satisfying the properties 5 and 6 such that κ({ǫ˜j}) =
κ({ǫj}) + 1. Given a gap-wise monotone function H =
∑M
j=1 θjjdj , we claim that
such ǫ˜j’s satisfying properties 5 and 6 can always be obtained from ǫj’s such that
HOPT ({ǫ˜j}) ≥ H
OPT ({ǫj}) as long as HOPT ({ǫj}) < HOPT , meaning that the
capacity can always be increased without any loss in optimal value as long as we do not
shoot over the absolute optimum HOPT . We have,
HOPT ({ǫ˜j})−H
OPT ({ǫj}) =
∑κ({ǫj})
j=2 jǫj(d1 − dj)−
∑κ({ǫj})+1
j=2 jǫ˜j(d1 − dj)
=
∑κ({ǫj})
j=2 j(ǫj − ǫ˜j)(d1 − dj)− (κ({ǫj}) + 1)ǫ˜κ({ǫj})+1(d1 − dκ({ǫj})+1).
Now we can always choose ǫ˜j’s satisfying properties 5 and 6 by taking suitable ǫ˜j ≤
ǫj ; j = 1, . . . , κ({ǫj})−1, ǫ˜κ({ǫj}) < ǫκ({ǫj}) and ǫ˜κ({ǫj})+1 ≤
Pκ({ǫj})
j=2 j(ǫj−ǫ˜j)(d1−dj)
(κ({ǫj})+1)(d1−dκ({ǫj})+1)
.
In particular, taking ǫ˜j = ǫj ; j = 1, . . . , κ({ǫj})−1, ǫ˜κ({ǫj}) < ǫκ({ǫj}) and ǫ˜κ({ǫj})+1 ≤
min
{ Pκ({ǫj})
j=2 j(ǫj−ǫ˜j)(d1−dj)
(κ({ǫj})+1)(d1−dκ({ǫj})+1)
,
κ({ǫj})(ǫκ({ǫj}))−ǫ˜κ({ǫj})
(κ({ǫj})+1)
}
does the job. An interesting
case to consider is when ǫj = ǫ > 0 for all j ≤ m and ǫj = 0 otherwise. And in this
case we can increase the capacity without loss in optimal value by taking ǫ˜j = ǫ˜ and
ǫ˜j = 0 otherwise, where
ǫ˜ ≤ min
{
2
(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
,
∑m
j=2 j(d1 − dj)∑m+1
j=2 j(d1 − dj)
ǫ
}
. (15)
Now let us define
a := min
j
j : d1 > dj
then it is clear that
HOPT ({ǫj}) = H
OPT whenever κ({ǫj}) < a
< HOPT whenever κ({ǫj}) ≥ a
and therefore, as long as κ({ǫj}) ≥ a capacity can always be increased without any
loss in the optimal value as discussed above, however there is a strict decrease in the
optimal value if we wish to increase capacity from a − 1 to a. We can naturally define
a parameter which we call price of capacity as follows:
ν({dj}) := max
{ǫj}:κ({ǫj})=a
(
HOPT
HOPT ({ǫj})
)
(16)
= max
{ǫj}:κ({ǫj})=a
(
d1
d1 − aǫa(d1 − da)
)
≤
d1
da
=
da−1
da
(17)
Thus, price of capacity is the worst possible loss in optimal value while increasing
capacity from a− 1 to a. Again let us consider the case when all non-zero ǫj = ǫ, then
ν({dj}) = max
0<ǫ≤ 2
a(a+1)
(
d1
d1 − aǫ(d1 − da)
)
=
d1
d1 −
2
a+1 (d1 − da)
=
(a+ 1)
(a− 1) + 2
(
da
d1
) ≤ 1 + 2
a− 1
≤ 3 (18)
Often our goal will be to maximize efficiency or revenue subject to the capacity
constraints, and consequently such a loss may not be considered good. Therefore, its
really a price that we are paying for increasing capacity.
4 Sponsored Search Auctions
As we discussed in the Section 2, one nice motivation for the study of capacity as a
metric for mechanism design comes from the sponsored search advertising. We first
describe the formal SSA model. Formally, in the current models, there are K slots
to be allocated among N (≥ K) bidders (i.e. the advertisers). A bidder i has a true
valuation vi (known only to the bidder i) for the specific keyword and she bids bi. The
expected click through rate (CTR) of an ad put by bidder i when allocated slot j has
the form CTRi,j = γjei i.e. separable in to a position effect and an advertiser effect.
γj’s can be interpreted as the probability that an ad will be noticed when put in slot
j and it is assumed that γj > γj+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K and γj = 0 for j > K . ei
can be interpreted as the probability that an ad put by bidder i will be clicked on if
noticed and is referred to as the relevance(quality score) of bidder i. The payoff/utility
of bidder i when given slot j at a price of p per-click is given by eiγj(vi − p). As of
now, Google as well as Yahoo! use schemes closely modeled as RBR(rank by revenue)
with GSP(generalized second pricing). The bidders are ranked in the decreasing order
of eibi and the slots are allocated as per this ranks. Let the σ(i) be the bidder allocated
to the slot i according to this ranking rule, then σ(i) is charged an amount equal to
eσ(i+1)bσ(i+1)
eσ(i)
per-click. This mechanism has been extensively studied in recent years[7,
12, 24, 13, 3]. The solution concept that is widely adopted to study this auction game is
a refinement of Nash equilibrium called symmetric Nash equilibria(SNE) independently
proposed by Varian[24] and Edelman et al[7]. For notational simplicity, let sσ(j+1) =
vσ(j+1)eσ(j+1) , then under this refinement, the revenue of the auctioneer at equilibrium
is given by
K∑
i=1
(γj − γj+1)jsσ(j+1). (19)
In this section, we discuss how to incorporate the capacity constraints in the keyword
auctions being currently used by Google and Yahoo!. We understand that there could
be several ways for doing so, however, we consider a very simple and intuitive way of
incorporating the capacity constraints via probability spikes as follows:
– The first K − 1 slots are sold as usual to the K − 1 high-ranked bidders.
– The last slot (i.e. theKth slot) is sold via probability spikes (p1, p2, . . . , pM ) among
theM bidders rankedK throughK+M−1.M is chosen to accommodate as many
more bidders as the auctioneer wants.
– There is a single combined auction for both of the above.
Clearly, the single combined auction is equivalent to the keyword auction with (K +
M−1) slots with position based CTRs taken as (γ1, γ2, . . . , γK−1, γkp1, γKp2, . . . , γKpM )
i.e. γ˜i = γi for i ≤ K− 1, γ˜K+j−1 = γKpj for 1 ≤ j ≤M and γ˜i = 0 otherwise. The
revenue of the auctioneer at SNE is
R =
∑K+M−1
j=1 (γ˜j − γ˜j+1)jsσ(j+1)
=
∑K−2
j=1 (γj − γj+1)jsσ(j+1) + γK−1(K − 1)sσ(K) − γKp1(K − 1)sσ(K)
+γK
∑K+M−1
j=K (pj+1−K − pj+2−K)jsσ(j+1).
Now, maximizing R as a function of pj’s is equivalent to maximizing the function
H = −γKp1(K − 1)sσ(K) + γK
∑K+M−1
j=K (pj+1−K − pj+2−K)jsσ(j+1)
=
∑M
j=1 θj
{
(K + j − 1)sσ(K+j) − (K − 1)sσ(K)
}
where θj = pj − pj+1; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1&θM = pM
=
∑M
j=1 θjjdj where dj =
1
j
{
(K + j − 1)sσ(K+j) − (K − 1)sσ(K)
}
.
Note that H may not be gap-wise monotone, however, it is not hard to see that the
similar linear programming analysis as in the Section 3.3 can be done to compute the
price of capacity in the present scenario of keyword auctions as well. We omit the
details.
Selling clicks via auctioneer-controlled probability spikes: a new model for sponsored
search advertising: The design framework in Section 3, suggests a new model for SSA,
where the clicks are sold directly and not indirectly via allocating impressions. In the
usual pay-per-click model, a click is assigned to one of the advertisers who has been
allocated an impression in the page currently being viewed by the user; thus, the user’s
collective experience determines the probability that an impression winner would be the
beneficiary of the click, and having set up the impressions and the user experience, the
auctioneer does not actively control the probability with which a click will be allocated
to a bidder. In the new model, a click could be considered as the indivisible item being
sold via probability spikes. Instead of putting ads directly in the slots, the auctioneer
could put some categories/information related to the specific keyword as a link. An
auction based on probability spikes is run whenever a user clicks on this link and the
user is directly taken to the landing page of the winning advertiser.
5 Future Work
In the present paper, our main goal was to motivate capacity as a fundamental metric
in designing auctions in the information economy and then to initiate study of such a
design framework for some simple and interesting scenarios such as single indivisible
item and sponsored search advertising. However, there are myriad of other interesting
scenarios where the capacity-enabled framework should be interesting to study. For
example, the auctions of digital goods[8, 9], combinatorial auctions [5] for selling in-
formation goods in bundles, double auctions and ad-exchanges[11] etc. Further, prob-
ably the most important question that remains to be addressed is to identify the best
way of putting capacity constraints and to see how generic the approach via probability
spikes could be made. We can consider the most general case of selling any set of items
e.g. heterogeneous, homogeneous, indivisible, or divisible or any combination their of.
Let Σ = {σi} be the set of all possible allocations. Further, the elements of Σ are
named such that σi  σi+1, where  is auctioneer’s preference over allocations. Then,
these set of items can be sold with capacity constraints via probability spikes pi’s with
pi ≥ pi+1, wherein σi is enforced with probability pi.
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